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Abstract:  The effect of Swedish regional investment grants during 1990-1999 on firm 
performance, in terms of returns on equity and number of employees, were studied using a 
propensity-score matching-method to control for sample selection. Firms that received grants 
did not perform better in terms of returns on equity when compared to matched firms in the 
control group. In most years, recipient firms also did not hire more employees. The results 
thus cast doubt on the use of regional investment grants as a general policy instrument to 
improve firm performance. 
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 1. Introduction 
Regional investment grants (RIG) distributed directly to firms are common in most 
industrialized countries around the world. Their goals are different, sometimes being focused 
on promoting economic growth in the region, other times more oriented towards alleviating 
the impact of structural changes in the economy. In either case, their existence is based on the 
assumption that they improve performance of the firms to which they are directed. 
 
A few empirical studies have investigated whether RIG actually influence firm performance. 
Wren (2005) found that Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) in the UK had been successful 
in promoting new jobs, and thus supporting its expansion. Harris (1991) found that Selective 
Financial Assistance (SFA) in Northern Ireland contributed to more jobs and investments in 
the region, while Harris and Trainor (2005) found that total factor productivity would have 
been 7-10% lower if the Northern Ireland firms had not received SFA. Harris and Trainor 
(2007) also found that SFA reduced the probability of plant closure by 15-24%. More 
supportive evidence was presented by Skuras et al. (2006), who found that Greek capital 
subsidies targeted at food and beverage manufacturing firms contributed to higher total factor 
productivity. 
  
On the other hand, Harris and Robinson (2004) found that RSA in the UK had no effect on 
productivity when targeted plants where compared to other plants within the assisted area. 
Similarly, Bergström (2000) found no effect of capital subsidies on total factor productivity in 
Sweden, while Lee (1996) found that industrial targeting in Korea actually lowered total 
factor productivity of the targeted firms. Thus, the evidence on whether RIG improve firm 
performance is mixed and inconclusive. 
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 The purpose of this paper is to study whether regional investment grants to firms in Sweden 
during 1990-1999 had a positive impact on firm performance, indicated by more employees 
and higher returns on equity. If RIG were successful, we expect that firms receiving grants 
will have raised employment and returns more than has a control group of firms with similar 
characteristics. 
 
The analysis is based on comprehensive panel-data set covering all limited firms in Sweden 
during the study period. From this dataset a sub-sample of firms from the two support areas 
were selected, thus guaranteeing that firms receiving the grant were not compared to firms 
from other parts of Sweden. There were considerable differences, on average, between firms 
that received RIG and the other firms, differences that were controlled for in the analysis 
using a propensity-score matching-method developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
Propensity-score matching makes it possible to compare firms that had or had not received 
RIG but are similar in all other relevant aspects. To our knowledge this method has not been 
previously applied to RIG. 
 
We find that firms receiving RIG did not have better development of returns on equity than 
others that did not receive grants. In addition, in most cases, RIG did not influence 
employment either. The exceptions were in 1994 and 1995, during the last years of the 1990 
recession. Thus, our results cast doubt on the general efficiency of RIG in promoting firm 
performance. 
 
The next section describes the RIG in Sweden, while Section 3 presents the data and the 
method of propensity-score matching as well as discussing the difference-in-difference 
3 
 estimation procedure. Results are then presented and discussed in Section 4, while Section 5 
details our conclusions. 
 
2. Regional grants in Sweden  
In Sweden, regional investment grants directly to firms go back to the 1960s, when firms were 
given grants if they made new investments in outlying regions with free capacity. RIG 
became even more common during the 1970s and more oriented towards reducing 
distributional differences across regions. However, from 1990 onwards, grants have been 
targeted more towards promoting economic growth. Grants are limited to firms that have a 
market outside their own county or that face competition from outside the county. Firms are 
not given grants that it is believed might undermine local competition.  
 
In order to receive RIG, the firm must apply in a writing to the County Administration Board 
(Länsstyrelsen) or the Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth (NUTEK), 
including a business plan and a description of the expected results. A processing officer 
decides whether the application is entitled of receiving support, taking into account the 
economic situation of the firm. For example, firms with lower probability of receiving 
financial support from commercial banks are more likely to receive grants so that high-risk 
projects are overrepresented. It is also evaluated whether the firm can expand and survive in 
the future, and any complaints to the Swedish Enforcement Authority (Kronofogden) are 
taken into account. Small firms and investments expected to increase integration and equality 
in society are also given priority.  
 
Grants can be given for investment in machinery, buildings, inventory, patents, and licenses. 
In exceptional cases, grants can also be given for investment in education, consulting, 
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 participating in conferences, and research and development. Depending on the region, grants 
can cover at most 20-30% of the total investment cost.  
 
RIG constitute the largest regional policy-instrument directed towards promoting firm 
performance in Sweden. Thus, this paper focuses on them, and excludes other grants from the 
empirical analysis. However, during the study period there were a number of other regional 
grants in Sweden, e.g., countryside-support grants, employment grants, transportation grants, 
and small-firm investment grants, which will also be described briefly.  
 
Countryside-support grants, also issued by the County Administrative Board 
(Länsstyrelserna), aimed to contribute to sustainable rural growth in rural areas in Sweden by 
ensuring a minimum of commercial services. Municipalities, retail stores, and gas stations 
were typical recipients.  
 
To promote growth and create new rural employment opportunities, there were two types of 
employment grants given to firms - when they recruited new employees, or when they entered 
new local markets – again issued by the County Administrative Board (Länsstyrelserna), or 
the Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth (NUTEK), or the Swedish national 
government itself. 
  
Transportation grants were also available to manufacturing firms in the four most northern 
municipalities in Sweden to compensate them for higher transportation costs. Finally, small-
firm investment grants (SFG) were available to firms with less than 50 employees but yearly 
revenues of more than seven million Euro.  
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 3. Empirical analysis  
3.1 Data 
In order to study whether regional investment grants for firms have any impact on firm 
performance, we need both firm-specific and region-specific data at the municipality level. 
Firm-specific data was obtained from MM-Partner, a Swedish firm that collects economic 
information on firms in Sweden. The data used here is from a dataset covering the annual 
reports of all limited firms that were tax-based in a specific municipality and active in the 
market during 1990-2000. The annual reports were originally submitted, as required by law, 
to the Swedish patent and registration office (PRV). The dataset includes, among other items, 
measures of profit, number of employees, salaries, fixed costs, and liquidity. In order to 
include only active firms in the empirical analysis, the sample was restricted to firms with 
documented sales during the study period. 
 
Municipality-specific data, including demographic measures, average income, political 
preferences, educational level, and unemployment, were provided by Statistics Sweden 
(SCB). Due to the division of some municipalities into smaller units during the study period, 
as well as the merger of three counties, 56 municipalities were omitted from the study, leaving 
233. 
 
Data concerning which firms received RIG during the study period was supplied by the 
Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth (NUTEK). All data used, irrespective of 
original source, was collected and provided to the authors by the Swedish Institute for Growth 
Policy Studies (ITPS). The results have also been presented (in Swedish) previously in an 
ITPS working paper (Ankarhem et al, 2007). 
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 3.2 Propensity score matching 
To test the effects of RIG on firm performance, we estimated the average effect on: (i) the 
number of employees, and (ii) the return on equity. The “treatment group” consists of firms 
that received RIG during the study period. Propensity-score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983) was used to match “untreated” observations with “treated observations” if they had a 
similar probability, based on firm characteristics, of being treated (i.e., receiving a grant). 
 
To take account of time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity, a difference-in-difference 
propensity-score matching-method was used. Thus, instead of studying numbers of employees 
and returns on equity directly, we focused on changes in those variables. If RIG were 
effective in promoting firm performance, we expect that firms receiving grants will have 
developed better after receiving grants than similar firms that did not receive grants. This 
method makes it possible to get an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect even if there were 
unobservable differences between firms that received RIG and other firms, as long as the 
differences were time-invariant.  
 
Matching methods differ by how much weight is placed on the control observations. Nearest-
neighbor matching was used here, putting all weight on the control (non-treated) observation 
with the most similar propensity score. This reduces bias, since only the best matches are 
used, but could lead to increased variance, compared to matching methods which use more 
control observations. We imposed a common support condition of maximum 0.00001 allowed 
distance between the propensity-score of the treated and the control. Treated observations for 
which no matches could be found within this distance were excluded. 
 
The final dataset contains 362,258 observations, of which 3,015 are from firms that received 
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 RIG. Table 1 below reports means and standard deviations for the variables included in the 
analysis for the treatment groups, control group, and all firms. On average, firms that received 
RIG differed substantially from other firms, with more employees and higher returns on 
equity. As mentioned, this sample selection was controlled for by using propensity-score 
matching.  
 
Table 1 about here. 
 
The first step in estimating the effects of RIG was thus to estimate propensity scores relating 
to the probability of belonging to the treatment group. Among a general set of models, the 
final specification was chosen using the Akaike consistent information criterion. As such, 
propensity scores were calculated using logit estimation of the equation 
 
RIGikt =   αj + αt + β1* Returnikt-1 +  β2* GDPContrikt-1 + β3* Employedikt-1                  (1)           
 
+ β4* Investmentsikt-1 + β5* Moreikt-1 + β6* Otherikt-1 
 
+ β7* Non-conservativekt-1 + β8* Political strengthkt-1 + β9* Samekt-1 
 
+ β10* Universitykt-1 + β11* Unemploymentkt-1 + β12* Incomekt-1 
 
+ β13* Migrationkt-1 + β14* (Unemploymentkt-1* Incomekt-1)  
 
+ β15* (Migrationkt-1* Incomekt-1) + β16* (dRegionikt* Incomekt-1) 
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  +  β17* (dRegionikt* Unemploymentkt-1) + εikt, 
 
where αj and αt are region-specific and time-specific fixed effects; Returnikt-1 is the return on 
equity of firm i in municipality k in the previous year; GDPContrikt-1 is the direct contribution 
of the firm to GDP; Employedikt-1 is the number of employees of the firm; and Investmentsikt-1 
is the size of the firm’s investments. Moreikt is then an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm had more than one regional investment grant, and Otherikt is an indicator variable equal 
to one if the firm also received other types of regional grants (such as employment grants or 
transportation grants etc., described in Section 2).  
 
Municipality-specific information was next included in the model: Non-conservativekt is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the municipality had a left-wing majority; Political strengthkt 
is a Herfindahl-index relating to the number of seats each party had in the local county 
council; and Samekt is an indicator variable equal to one if the political majority was the same 
in the municipality as at the national level. Universitykt is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the municipality had a university or university college; Unemploymentkt is the share of the 
municipal population unemployed; Incomekt measures average income in the municipality; 
and Migrationkt measures the in- or outflow of people as a share of the municipal population. 
 
Finally, since it is likely that there are interactions among some of the variables, the model 
also contains interaction-terms for Unemploymentkt* Incomekt, Migrationkt* Incomekt, 
dRegionikt* Incomekt,  and dRegionikt* Unemploymentkt. 
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 The results from logit estimation of Equation (1) are presented in Table 2 (below), where the 
region- and time-specific fixed effects, and the interactions including the region-specific fixed 
effects, have been excluded to save space.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Firms with higher direct contribution to GDP and more employees had a higher probability of 
receiving a grant, as did those that had previously received either a regional investment grant 
or some other form of government grant. In addition, low investment in period t-1 increased 
the probability of receiving a grant. RIG were also more common in municipalities with 
strong political leadership (as measured by the Herfindahl index), no university or university 
college, and low average income. 
  
The next step involved finding the best possible match in the control group for each “treated” 
firm, and comparing outcomes. It seems reasonable to believe, however, that RIG effects are 
not constant over time. We therefore divided the data into yearly sub-periods to test this 
possibility. Thus the logit equation used to find matches was also estimated for each year 
(results left out in order to save space). 
 
3.3 Difference-in-difference estimates 
There is also a question of the timing of grant effects, since some investments might take 
some time to complete, and effects on employment or returns on equity might not show up for 
even longer. Difference-in-difference estimates were thus calculated over one, three, and five 
years after the grant year.  
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 Finally, there could also be a so-called threshold effect, if grants need to reach a certain size 
before having any measurable effect on employment or returns. Thus the analysis was also 
performed using only grants exceeding one hundred thousand SEK or exceeding one million 
SEK. 
 
4. Regional investment grants and firm performance 
 
Yearly and overall difference-in-difference estimates of the effects of RIG on employment are 
presented (Table 3, below) for one-, three-, and five-year periods and for grants exceeding 
SEK 100,000 or SEK 1,000,000. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
In most of the estimated models, no statistically significant effect on employment was found, 
indicating that, in general, recipient firms did not increase their number of employees more 
than similar firms that did not receive a grant. Hence, RIG do not seem to have been very 
successful in increasing employment during the study period. 
 
However, there are a few exceptions. For grant of any size, there are positive and statistically 
significant effects after three years for 1993 and 1994 recipients; after 5 years for 1994 
recipients; and after one year for 1995 recipients. Recipients in 1993, on average, employed 
18 persons more during 1993-1996 than did firms not receiving a grant, and 15 persons more 
during 1994-1997. Recipients in 1994, on average, employed 20 more during 1994-1999 than 
did firms not receiving a grant. Recipients in 1995 also employed slightly more than others 
during that year. All these statistically significant results were in 1993 to 1995, i.e. during the 
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 end of the Swedish recession of the early 1990s, and this pattern holds for larger grants as 
well. 
 
Recipients of over one hundred thousand SEK in 1994, on average, employed 5 more during 
that year, 21 more during 1994-1997, and 30 more during 1994-1999. Recipients of more than 
one million SEK in 1992 employed 9 more during 1992-1995, while recipients in 1993 
employed 13 more during that year and 48 more during 1993-1996. 
 
Similar estimates of effects on returns are presented in Table 4 (below). 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
No statistically significant effects were found. Thus, recipient firms did not seem to perform 
better in terms of returns on equity than similar firms that did not receive a grant.  
 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
The aim of this paper has been to study whether regional investment grants targeted towards 
firms affect employment or owners’ returns on equity. To control for sample selection, we 
used propensity-score matching, whereby firms that received grants were compared to 
otherwise similar firms that received no grants during the study period. 
 
Regional investment grants did not seem to have any impact on firm performance. Firms that 
received grants did not perform better in terms of returns on equity when compared to 
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 matched firms in the control group. In most years, recipient firms also did not hire more 
employees, and we thus conclude that, in general, RIG do not affect employment. The few 
exceptions during 1993-1995, were during the recovery from the early 1990s recession.  
 
The results thus cast doubt on the use of regional investment grants as a general policy 
instrument to improve firm performance. An issue for future research is whether other types 
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 Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev.
Returnikt-1 0,02 0,46 0,01 13,01 0,01 13,00
GDPContikt-1 10876209,00 79843067,00 3504655,80 388876425,77 3516557,30 388575726,87
Employedikt-1 44,63 341,91 9,96 130,19 10,01 130,81
Investmentsikt-1 1687410,00 66121978,00 869392,30 366237368,10 870630,70 365969084,53
Moreikt-1 0,10 0,31 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01
Otherikt-1 0,53 0,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03
Socialistkt-1 0,77 0,40 0,56 0,47 0,56 0,47
Political strengthkt-1 0,30 0,05 0,27 0,05 0,27 0,05
Samekt-1 0,53 0,49 0,49 0,48 0,49 0,48
Universitykt-1 0,24 0,40 0,54 0,47 0,54 0,47
Unemploymentkt-1 4,17 1,76 3,96 4,28 3,96 4,28
Incomekt-1 133476,00 16724,33 151650,50 23580,75 151621,20 23582,58
Migrationkt-1 0,62 0,47 0,29 0,43 0,29 0,43
Unemploymentkt-1 * Incomekt-1 226435,70 93554,72 234527,50 237196,36 234514,00 237034,83
Migrationkt-1 * Incomekt-1 34250,70 25612,36 17079,80 25606,13 17107,50 25615,41
Treatment Control All firms
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 Table 2: Estimation results, probability of receiving regional investment grants, 1990-2000 
Variable Est. St.err
Returnikt-1 1.84E-04 6.27E-04
GDPContikt-1 9.01E-09 2.23E-09 ***
Employedikt-1 2.29E-04 2.70E-05 ***
Investmentsikt-1 -1.90E-08 9.86E-09 *
Moreikt-1 6.79 0.91 ***
Otherikt-1 8.93 0.15 ***
Socialistkt-1 0.22 0.15
Political strengthkt-1 3.83 0.87 ***
Samekt-1 -0.54 0.18 ***
Universitykt-1 -0.28 0.09 ***
Unemploymentkt-1 0.07 0.28
Incomekt-1 -0.04 0.02 ***
Migrationkt-1 -0.82 0.59
Unemploymentkt-1 * Incomekt-1 2.30E-03 4.31E-03
Migrationkt-1 * Incomekt-1 0.03 0.01 **
Pseudo R
2 0.58
* statistically significant at the 10% level.
** statistically significant at the 5% level.





 Table 3: Difference-in-difference estimates, number of employees. 
Year Est. St.err. Est. St.err. Est. St.err.
RIG
1990-1999 1,86 2,63 5,40 8,81 9,27 13,06
1990 0,79 11,61 -23,77 25,06 -26,52 49,25
1991 6,46 4,65 0,11 5,95 14,45 10,69
1992 -2,15 1,80 -1,60 4,87 -10,16 10,72
1993 100,76 108,12 18,39 10,71 * 98,79 64,17
1994 2,07 2,83 14,73 8,22 * 20,50 11,13 *
1995 3,14 1,60 * 8,22 7,04 10,22 8,47
1996 0,18 22,92 3,56 14,77




1990-1999 2,65 2,26 5,76 8,58 10,70 16,39
1990 2,96 15,57 -18,67 22,99 -24,68 23,86
1991 3,26 3,67 2,97 6,09 15,78 12,53
1992 0,20 0,90 2,93 1,92 2,11 11,88
1993 4,43 4,07 21,65 26,79 106,47 69,76
1994 5,18 2,73 * 20,98 10,80 * 30,07 13,50 *
1995 2,17 1,81 2,51 5,80 2,67 9,54
1996 0,81 2,72 4,86 15,48




1990-1999 7,33 6,94 19,31 33,78 26,65 41,78
1990 -1,41 26,48 -42,99 54,16 -47,86 73,71
1991 6,76 11,56 12,17 27,36 57,61 45,71
1992 2,14 3,66 9,38 4,80 * 6,63 6,19
1993 13,42 6,15 * 48,41 27,94 * 403,76 335,81
1994 -2,30 18,07 78,94 73,73 107,15 101,23
1995 -2,05 5,95 13,00 19,74 -0,94 27,00
1996 1,85 5,13 6,48 9,84
1997 24,41 27,80 228,96 273,05
1998 -53,46 58,27
1999 -0,14 6,13
* statistically significant at the 10 percent significance level.




 Table 4: Difference-in-difference estimates, the return on equity. 
Effect in
Year Est. St.err. Est. St.err. Est. St.err.
RIG
1990-1999 -0,06 0,19 -0,09 0,25 0,00 0,16
1990 -0,84 0,89 -0,02 0,11 0,01 0,02
1991 0,01 0,02 -1,49 1,19 -0,10 0,32
1992 0,00 0,04 -0,28 0,18 -0,23 0,25
1993 0,37 0,73 0,03 0,56 0,01 0,44
1994 0,14 0,45 -0,47 0,36 -0,02 0,08
1995 -0,10 0,13 0,05 0,07 0,05 0,08
1996 0,00 0,02 -0,02 0,04




1990-1999 -0,12 0,18 -0,17 0,17 -0,04 0,05
1990 -0,44 0,88 -0,01 0,09 -0,02 0,02
1991 0,05 0,10 -1,41 1,45 0,05 0,30
1992 -0,03 0,10 0,04 0,06 -0,01 0,05
1993 1,46 1,81 0,14 0,40 0,02 0,06
1994 -0,06 0,19 -0,11 0,64 0,02 0,03
1995 -0,04 0,81 0,01 0,06 0,02 0,08
1996 0,00 0,39 -0,07 0,05




1990-1999 -0,63 0,49 -0,47 0,42 0,09 0,12
1990 -2,67 1,60 0,00 0,27 -0,02 0,03
1991 0,05 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,02 0,07
1992 -0,01 0,04 0,03 0,25 0,02 0,16
1993 -0,03 0,06 0,05 0,15 0,06 0,09
1994 -0,55 0,33 -0,38 0,40 0,02 0,08
1995 0,64 0,74 0,08 0,08 0,10 0,13
1996 -0,02 0,03 0,00 0,05
1997 0,15 1,92 -0,07 0,10
1998 -0,07 0,14
1999 -0,05 0,07
* statistically significant at the 10 percent significance level.
Standard errors are calculated using bootstrapping.
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